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SURVEY SECTION
Conftict of Law. Nadeau v. Nadeau, 716 A.2d 717 (R.I. 1998). In
the event of a conflict of laws, the Parental Kidnapping Prevention
Act (PKPA) preempts state law founded on the Uniform Child Cus-
tody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA). Thus, if emergency jurisdiction is
assumed under state law, that jurisdiction is temporary in nature.
Once the emergency abates, proper jurisdiction will be determined
by the PKPA.
In Nadeau v. Nadeau,' the Rhode Island Supreme Court ad-
dressed the confusion surrounding two statutes designed to resolve
jurisdictional conflict in child custody cases.2 The Connecticut
court made an initial determination in an interstate custody dis-
pute.3 Because Connecticut's jurisdiction was emergency in na-
ture, it was temporary. 4 Therefore, the supreme court had to
decide if Connecticut had an alternate ground of jurisdiction. 5 The
Connecticut Superior Court argued it had state law jurisdiction
under the UCCJA.6 In examining the two statutes the court af-
firmed the Rhode Island Family Court's holding that federal law,
the PKPA, preempts the state's law, the UCCJA.7 Under the
PKPA, home-state jurisdiction is preferred.8 Because Rhode Is-
land is the home state, it has proper jurisdicton to make a perma-
nent determination of the interstate custody issues on the merits.9
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Sharon and Donald Nadeau, M.D., were married with five chil-
dren and lived in Coventry, Rhode Island in 1997.10 In April of
1997, Sharon and the children fled from Coventry and moved to
the Connecticut." Sharon had grown up in Connecticut and her
parents resided there. 12 Sharon claimed that her husband had
1. 716 Ao2d 717 (R.I. 1998).
2. See id.
3. See id. at 718.
4. See id. at 724.
5. See id. at 725.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id. at 718.
11. See id.
12. See id.
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subjected her to years of physical, emotional, and psychological
abuse, which caused her to flee Rhode Island. 13
Sharon petitioned the Connecticut Superior Court, seeking
custody of the children, and protection from her husband Donald.
14
The temporary order was granted and the Connecticut Superior
Court set a date for a hearing on permanent custody. 15 In addi-
tion, Sharon filed for divorce. 16 Shortly thereafter, Donald peti-
tioned the Rhode Island Family Court.' 7 He filed for divorce,
sought custody of the children, and protection from Sharon.' 8 He
alleged that Sharon was psychologically incompetent to care for
the children.19 Despite being served with notice of the Connecticut
proceedings, Donald did not disclose the status of the proceedings
to the Rhode Island Family Court in the divorce complaint.20 In
his custody and protection motions, he noted that Sharon had filed
motions in Connecticut, but argued that they were without cause
and that the Connecticut Superior Court lacked jurisdiction. 21
The Rhode Island Family Court ordered Sharon to return the chil-
dren to Rhode Island and granted Donald temporary custody of the
children. 22
With proceedings commenced in both states, the Connecticut
Superior Court made its prior temporary order permanent, and
granted sole custody to Sharon.23 There now existed two custody
orders in direct conflict with each other. Donald presented a mo-
tion to dismiss the Connecticut proceedings in the Connecticut Su-
perior Court for jurisdictional failure.24 He also petitioned the
Rhode Island Family Court for a determination on the jurisdiction
issue.25 The Rhode Island Family Court held that it had proper
jurisdiction over all divorce and custody proceedings concerning
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See id. at 719.
25. See id.
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Sharon, Donald and their children.26 However, the record lacked
evidence that the Rhode Island justice knew about the Connecticut
order and proceedings. 27
Sharon tried to have the Rhode Island proceedings dis-
missed.28 At this time, the Rhode Island judge suspended the
Rhode Island actions.29 Pursuant to section 15-14-7 of the UCCJA,
the Rhode Island judge attempted to contact the Connecticut court
in order to determine the status of the Connecticut action. 30 Be-
cause the Rhode Island Court was unsuccessful in its attempts to
contact the Connecticut judge, it decided to proceed with the deter-
mination of Sharon's motion to dismiss. 31
The trial judge recognized that the PKPA was enacted to re-
solve these type of jurisdictional problems.3 2 The court held that
in cases where state law conflicts with the PKPA, the state law is
preempted.3 3 In accordance with the PKPA, the trial judge held
that regardless of the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by Con-
necticut, Rhode Island has preference under the PKPA because it
is the home state of the children. 34 The judge then held that
although the exercise of jurisdiction by Connecticut would be
proper if characterized as emergency in nature, that jurisdiction
was temporary.35 Once the emergency abated, Rhode Island would
be the proper state under the PKPA to make a final determination
concerning any out-of-state orders.36 . In response to the determi-
nation by the family court, Sharon petitioned the Rhode Island
Supreme Court by writ of certiori and demanded a stay of the
Rhode Island proceedings.37
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id. at 719-20,
32. See id. at 720.
33. See id.
34. See id. "The children had resided in Rhode Island for at least six months
before moving with their mother to Connecticut." Id.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37, See id.
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BACKGROUND
Congress enacted the UCCJA in order to provide rules which
would govern jurisdictional disputes in interstate child custody
cases.38 Rhode Island adopted the UCCJA as state law in 1978.3 9
Connecticut has also adopted the UCCJA as state law. 40 Congress'
goal was to have each state adopt the UCCJA in order to provide
uniform rules. 41 Problems arose when some states failed to adopt
the statute or adopted the statute with material changes.42 Those
states became havens for parents who kidnapped their children; a
non-UCCJA state did not have to follow the jurisdictional guide-
lines.43 Congress responded with the PKPA; this federal law re-
quired states to conform to each other's pre-existing orders as long
as they were consistent with the PKPA. 4
The finding of consistency is a two-part test. First, the court
that enters the initial orders must have state law jurisdiction pur-
suant to the UCCJA.45 The court must then fulfill one of the five
acceptable conditions set forth in the PKPA.46 An example of an
acceptable basis is where the state is the home state of the child.47
"Home state" is defined as the place where the child most recently
resided for at least six months.4 Another acceptable basis is if it
appears that no other state has home state jurisdiction and it is in
the best interests of the child to assume jurisdiction. 49 The best
interest may be demonstrated by a significant connection with the
state.50 It is also acceptable for the state to assume jurisdiction if
the child is in the state and has been abandoned or is in an emer-
gency situation where he or she may be the victim of abuse.51 Sat-
38. See id. at 721.
39. See id. (citing Paolino v. Paolino, 420 A.2d 830, 835 (R.I. 1980)).
40. See id. at 719 n.1 (citing Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-93 (1994)).
41. See id. at 721.
42. See id. (citing Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 181 (1988); Sheila L.
v. Ronald P.M., 465 S.E.2d 210, 218 (W.Va. 1995)).
43. See id. (citing Thompson, 484 U.S. at 181).
44. See id. (citing Thompson, 484 U.S. at 175-76).
45. See id. (citing Thompson, 484 U.S. at 176-77).
46. See id.
47. See id. at 722 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(A)(1996)).
48. See id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(b)(4)).
49. See id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(B)).
50. See id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(C)).
51. See id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(C)).
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isfaction of any one of these conditions results in a proper exercise
of jurisdiction under the PKPA.
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court determined that the Con-
necticut Superior Court had properly exercised its jurisdiction
under the PKPA.52 Connecticut's exercise was the continuing ju-
risdiction type, made in response to an emergency situation and
continued because the parties remained in the state.53 The
supreme court addressed the family court's characterization of the
Connecticut jurisdiction as temporary. 54 The family court relied
on Benda v. Benda,55 a recent New Jersey case. Though Benda
involved the modification of a previously existing custody order,
rather than an inital custody order, the court found that the basic
principle was the same.5 6 Both the UCCJA and the PKPA are
designed to prevent conflict.5 7 Because of this, an exercise of emer-
gency jurisdiction consistent with both the UCCJA and the PKPA
must still not conflict with the preferred home-state jurisdiction in
cases where interstate custody is at issue.58
The Rhode Island Supreme Court declared that Connecticut's
jurisdiction was temporary.59 It then looked to which state had
proper permanent jurisdiction over Sharon and Donald's claims. It
is here where the UCCJA and the PKPA conflicted. Under the
UCCJA, adopted by Connecticut, jurisdiction is best exercised
where it fits the best interest of the child.60 Sharon argued that
Connecticut is in the children's best interests. 61 Under the PKPA,
the preference is for home-state jurisdiction.62 Under this analy-
sis, all parties agreed that the home state was Rhode Island.63 The
supreme court held that federal law, the PKPA, must preempt
52. See id. at 723.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. 565 A.2d 1121 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989).
56. See Nadeau, 716 A.2d at 724.
57. See id. at 721.
58. See id. at 724-25.
59. See id. at 724.
60. See id. at 725.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See id.
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Connecticut's state law.64 The court then remanded the case to the
family court to hear the custody hearing on the merits, with a clear
grant of jurisdiction.65
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court settled an important conflict
in two interstate custody laws in Nadeau v. Nadeau. The court's
determination of the preemptive nature of the PKPA is consistent
with the intent of Congress to create uniform laws in interstate
custody conflicts. By declaring emergency jurisdiction temporary,
the supreme court has ensured that the PKPA will provide power-
ful guidelines for future interstate custody disputes.
Carly E. Beauvais
64. See id. at 725-26.
65. See id. at 726.
